Amagi-class battlecruiser
|Class after= |Subclasses= |Built range=1920–1922 |In commission range= |Total ships building= |Total ships planned=4 |Total ships completed=0 (1 converted into an aircraft carrier) |Total ships cancelled=4 |Total ships lost=1 |Total ships scrapped=3 }} |module2= normal full load |Ship length=826 ft 1 in (251.8 m) |Ship beam=101 ft (30.8 m) |Ship draft=31 ft (9.5 m) |Ship propulsion=4-shaft Gihon turbines, 19 Kampon boilers |Ship speed= |Ship range= at |Ship complement=1,600 |Ship power= |Ship armament=10 × L/45 guns 16 × 5.5 in (140 mm) L/50 guns 6 × 4.7 in (120 mm) L/45 AA guns 8 × 24 in (610 mm) torpedo tubes |Ship armor=Belt: Deck: 3.875 in (98 mm) Conning Tower: Torpedo bulkheads: 2.875 in (73 mm) Barbettes: 9–11 in (229–280 mm) }} }} The was a series of four battlecruisers planned for the Imperial Japanese Navy as part of the so-called Eight-eight fleet. The ships were to be named Amagi, , Atago, and Takao (initially named ''Ashitaka''),Daiji Katagiri (1988), p. 93 after the mountains Amagi, Akagi, Atago, and Takao.Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships (p. 235) states that Takao was named for the town of Takao, Formosa, and some sources repeat this. However, the name Takao for Japanese warships predated the renaming of the town, and Lacroix (p. 122) states that the name was simply re-used for the battlecruiser. The Amagi design was essentially a lengthened version of the battleship, but with a thinner armored belt and deck and a modified secondary battery arrangement.Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 235 Limitations imposed by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty prevented the class from being completed as designed. However, the treaty had a limited allowance for hulls already under construction to be converted into aircraft carriers. Amagi and Akagi were both intended for conversion, but an earthquake damaged the hull of Amagi so extensively that the ship was scrapped. Akagi was reconstructed as an aircraft carrier and served with distinction as part of the Kido Butai during the Second World War, participating in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor before being sunk at the Battle of Midway. Design Dimensions and machinery The ships had a planned displacement of and at a full load. The class design was 820 ft 3 in (250 m) long at the waterline, and 826 ft 1 in (251.8 m) overall. The ships would have had a beam of 101 ft (30.8 m) and a draft of 31 ft (9.5 m) and would have used four propeller shafts, powered by Gihon turbines. The design staff intended to use turbine engines, which were to be powered by 19 Kampon water-tube boilers, eleven of which were oil-fired, while the other eight were to have mixed oil and coal for fuel. This system was designed to provide for a top speed of . The planned fuel stores amounted to 3,900 tons of oil and 2,500 tons of coal. The ships had a planned cruising speed of , and with full fuel stores, the ships would have had a maximum range of . Armament The ships were to be equipped with a main battery of ten 16 in (406 mm) L/45L/45 denotes the length of the gun barrels; in this case, the gun is 45 calibers, meaning that the gun is 45 times long as it is in diameter. guns in five twin turrets, although an L/50 gun tested in 1920 might have been implemented instead. The guns fired 2,205 lb (1,000 kg) armor-piercing projectiles with a 494 lb (224 kg) propellant charge at 2,592 ft/s (790 m/s), at a rate of fire between 1.5 to 2.5 rounds per minute. Each gun had 90 rounds and an approximate barrel life of 250–300 shots. The turrets would have been arranged along the centerline: two superfiring turrets fore, and three in line aft of the superstructure. The gun turrets weighed 1,004 tons (1,020 mt), and allowed for depression of −5 degrees and elevation of 30 degrees. The secondary battery was to have consisted of sixteen 5.5 in (140 mm) L/50 guns mounted in casemates along the center of the ship. These guns fired 83.8 lb (38.0 kg) projectiles and used 22.8–24.2 lb (10.33–10.97 kg) of propellant at a muzzle velocity of 2,789–2,805 ft/s (850–855 m/s). The guns had a maximum elevation of 25 degrees, which enabled a maximum range of . Four, later increased to six, 4.7 in (120 mm) L/45 anti-aircraft guns were to have been mounted amidships, along with eight 24 in (610 mm) above-water torpedo tubes. Armor It was planned that the Amagi class would be protected by a main belt 10 in (254 mm) thick, sloped at 12 degrees, and a torpedo bulkhead 2.875 in (73 mm) thick. The main battery barbettes were designed to have between 9 and 11 in (229–280 mm) of armor plating, and the conning tower would have had armor ranging in thickness from 3 in (76 mm) to a maximum of 14 in (356 mm). Deck armor was to have been 3.875 in (98 mm) thick. Background Experiences in the Russo-Japanese War convinced naval war planners that more fast capital ships were needed, so on 4 April 1907, the Imperial Defence Council approved an "Eight-eight" policy. This plan originally called for a fleet of eight battleships and eight armored cruisers that would all be under ten years old (later changed to eight battlecruisers and reduced to eight years old). However, the advent of the dreadnought battleship crippled this plan at the beginning; given Japan's weak and underdeveloped economy and the enormous strain that had been put on it during the Russo-Japanese War (Japan emerged from the war victorious, but bankrupt),Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 222 the launch of was a "disaster" for Japan.Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 223 In 1907, Japan was halfway to the eight-eight, with two newly delivered battleships (the ) in the fleet and two more (the ) and four armored cruisers authorized or under construction. In addition, three more battleships and four armored cruisers had been authorized, though not funded. However, naval technology was changing; older battleships, including all of Japan's battleships in commission or under construction,While the s were technically "semi-dreadnoughts" due to their heavy secondary battery, they were still made obsolete by . were quickly rendered obsolete with the commissioning of HMS Dreadnought (hence the terms dreadnought and pre-dreadnought), and armored cruisers were seemingly useless in the face of the new battlecruisers being laid down by Great Britain and Germany. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) recognized this, and proposed in 1909 that two battlecruisers be ordered from British plans, with one to be built in Great Britain and one to be built at home. These two ships became the . In 1910, there was still authorization for one battleship and four armored cruisers. This battleship, a more heavily armored version of the Kongō-class battlecruisers, became Japan's first super-dreadnought, . With these ships, Japan appeared to be getting closer to the eight-eight goal; however, these new ships represented a "new level of naval strength" for the IJN, and they made all previous Japanese capital ships obsolete. This meant that any naval planner aiming for an eight-eight fleet would have to call for seven more battleships and four more battlecruisers at a time when Japan was trying to weather a worldwide economic depression. After proposals from the IJN in 1911 and 1912 for massive shipbuilding programs, the Cabinet compromised down to a "four-four" plan; under this, three new battleships and no new battlecruisers were authorized.Gardiner and Gray (1984), pp. 222–223 The Navy did not agree, and instead called for an "eight-four" fleet, while the Imperial Defence Council called for the original eight-eight. The Cabinet relented, and by July 1914, it was decided to aim first for an eight-four fleet, followed by the eight-eight fleet. The eight-four plan was presented to the Diet of Japan in 1915; it aimed to have the eight battleships and four battlecruisers by 1923 with the building of two and two s. The problem with this was that the old plan intended all of the ships of the eight-eight fleet to be under eight years old; by the time these new ships were completed, Fusō and the first two Kongō ships would be past their replacement age.Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 224 The plan was approved in 1917, along with funding for two battlecruisers which became the Amagi class. In late 1917, the Navy proposed to expand the eight-four plan by adding two more battlecruisers; this was approved, and two more Amagi-class ships were ordered. However, having eight 16 in (406 mm) gun ships (four battleships and four battlecruisers) on order put an enormous financial strain on Japan, which was spending about a third of its national budget on the Navy. The massive size and scale of its building program was rapidly driving up the cost of naval construction and armament. Construction, cancellation, and conversion was the first ship of the class to be laid down; construction began on 6 December 1920 at the naval yard in Kure. Amagi followed ten days later at the Yokosuka naval yard. The projected completion dates for the first pair of ships were December and November 1923, respectively. Atago was laid down in Kobe at the Kawasaki shipyard on 22 November 1921, and was projected to be finished in December 1924. Takao, the fourth and final ship of the class, was laid down at the Mitsubishi shipyard in Nagasaki on 19 December 1921, and was also projected to be completed in December 1924. The Washington Naval Treaty, signed in February 1922, greatly reduced the tonnage allowed for capital ships in the signatory nations. The treaty also instituted a moratorium on new warship construction; battlecruisers canceled under this included one class each from Japan, the United States, and Great Britain: the Amagi class, the and the G3 class, respectively.See: Washington Naval Treaty, Chapter II, Part III, Section II The treaty did allow for battleship and battlecruiser hulls currently under construction to be converted into aircraft carriers, but only if these new carriers were kept under a 27,000-ton limit. Considering that the Amagi class were designed to displace at full load in their battlecruiser configuration, this would have been a rather difficult displacement to obtain. However, the Americans also had the same problem when designing a conversion of their Lexington class, so an exception, spearheaded by US Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., was added to the treaty that gave the five signatories the option of converting up to two capital ships that were under construction to 33,000-ton aircraft carriers.Friedman (1983), p. 43See: Washington Naval Treaty, Chapter I, Article IX This resulted in the United States and Japan quickly reordering two ships each. Japan chose Amagi and Akagi, the two ships nearest to completion, for conversion. The September 1923 Great Kantō earthquake in Tokyo caused significant stress damage to the hull of Amagi. The structure was too heavily damaged to be usable, and conversion work was abandoned. Amagi was stricken from the navy list and sold for scrapping, which began on 14 April 1924. The other two ships, Atago and Takao, were officially canceled two years later (31 July 1924) and were broken up for scrap in their slipways. The incomplete , on which work had stopped on 5 February 1922, was reordered as a carrier to replace Amagi.Gardiner and Gray eds. (1984), p. 232 ''Akagi'' s career as an aircraft carrier The conversion of Akagi began on 19 November 1923, and was completed in March 1927. However, the strange assortment of flight decks fitted on Akagi—a main landing deck superimposed over two short take-off decks—proved unsatisfactory, and the ship was withdrawn from active service in 1935 for modernization. The lower two flight decks were removed, the main deck was lengthened to 817 ft (249 m), and a third elevator was added.Stille, p. 12 Refitting was completed in 1938.Kotani, Ken. "Pearl Harbor: Japanese planning and command structure" in Marston (2005), pp. 32–33 Akagi supported operations off China in early 1939 and 1940, and underwent an overhaul in November 1940. Akagi served as Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's flagship in the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Nagumo's Kido Butai—composed of the carriers Akagi, Kaga, , , , and , supported by escorts—launched two waves of airstrikes on the American base at Pearl Harbor in a devastating surprise attack. American losses included four battleships and two destroyers sunk and nearly 200 aircraft destroyed.Hoyt (2001), pp. 225–228Kotani, Ken. "Pearl Harbor: Japanese planning and command structure" in Marston (2005), pp. 40–41Ireland (1998), p. 190 On 19 February 1942, aircraft from Akagi, Hiryū, Sōryū, and Kaga participated in the bombing of Darwin, Australia.Hoyt (2001), p. 260 On 27 February, their bombers severely damaged the old American carrier , which was subsequently scuttled by her escort. Akagi and the carriers Hiryū and Sōryū were sent in March 1942 with a mixed force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to the Indian Ocean to engage the British fleet there and to support planned attacks on Ceylon. In the Easter Sunday Raid on 5 April, aircraft from the carriers struck the British base at Colombo, destroying a number of aircraft and sinking an armed merchant cruiser and the old destroyer in the harbor.Hoyt (2001), p. 268 The Japanese fleet also spotted the heavy cruisers and at sea; both ships were sunk in an overwhelming air attack. On 9 April the carriers attacked British installations at Trincomalee, destroying aircraft and sinking the carrier , the destroyer , and the corvette .Ireland (1998), p. 191 Battle of Midway In late May 1942, in an effort to draw out and destroy the elusive American carriers, Japanese forces organized attacks on the Aleutian Islands in Alaska and Midway Atoll in the Western Pacific.Ireland (1998), p. 197 Nagumo, aboard Akagi, led Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū and the support ships of the First Carrier Striking Force to Midway.Love, Robert. "The Height of Folly" in Marston (2005), p. 89Hoyt (2001), p. 293 In the initial attack, Japanese planes neutralized a small force of fighter aircraft and inflicted heavy damage to American installations.Hoyt (2001), p. 295 Torpedo planes and dive-bombers sent from Midway to harry the Japanese fleet had little effect, but the Japanese attack plan had been deciphered by codebreakers, and the American carriers' planes were already en route.Love, Robert. "The Height of Folly" in Marston (2005), p. 93 Torpedo bombers from , , and joined the attack in succession, forcing the Japanese carriers to maneuver violently to avoid torpedoes and rendering them unable to launch additional aircraft.Ireland (1998), p. 200 American dive-bombers, arriving late after difficulty locating the fleet, soon landed fatal strikes on Akagi, Kaga, and Sōryū. Yorktown, handicapped by hits from Hiryū s bombers, managed to return to the fight only to take two torpedo hits a couple of hours later. The burning Yorktown was abandoned, but her scouts pinpointed Hiryū s location, and bombers from Enterprise put Hiryū out of action with four bomb strikes. Japan lost all four carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force at Midway.Love, Robert. "The Height of Folly" in Marston (2005), p. 97 See also * ''Destroyermen'', a series set in an alternate reality and featuring a rebuilt Amagi Notes References Bibliography * * * * * * * * * * "Washington Naval Treaty" of 1922. Washington Naval Conference. * Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Naval History & Heritage Command, United States Department of the Navy. Print publications 1959–1991; digital version available at the Online DANFS Project. External links * [http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/battleships/ijn_dr.htm Haze Gray & Underway page on Japanese battlecruisers, dreadnoughts and semi-dreadnoughts] Amagi-class battlecruisers Category:Battlecruiser classes